

composed of pure memories on the one hand, and perceptions, coloured by memory in its form of habit taking effect in movements, on the other. These stages are represented as different layers, but this is probably to be understood figuratively. Apart from the artificial conceptual of the soul, and from some questionable neurology, there is much good psychological analysis, which is indeed familiar in principle in England from the recent criticisms of associationist writers, but is presented here in an individual form (reminding the reader of Prof. Baldwin) through M. Bergson's insistence on the motor character of perception, and on the motor element involved in recognition.

Perception then, not pure, but in its familiar form, is a junction of two processes: the one working from the soul downwards, from memory to movement; the other upwards, from the external object to the finite centre which is the brain. The author then proceeds to show how the two apparent disparities, matter and mind, can thus meet by resolving the chief oppositions of the extended and the unextended, the quantitative and the qualitative, the free and the necessary. As to the first he maintains that matter is divided into pieces only for practical purposes, being in fact continuous, that both perception and matter are 'extensive,' while the space or extension which in thought belongs to matter as distinguished from mind is but a 'schema' which represents its practical divisibility. The quality of sensations as distinguished from the quantitative character of the movements of bodies he supposes to be due to the contraction produced by memory—every sensation containing the memory of the immediately preceding vibrations, and several millions of vibrations (as in light) being contracted into a second, whereas to perceive each separately would require years. Sensible qualities and quantitative movements differ thus in respect of 'tension,' and the author declares that the difference of body and mind is thus to be expressed in terms of time rather than of space. The meaning of liberty (so far as it can be made out from this work) has already been indicated in connexion with the selection produced by the organism in perception.

There is much to be learnt from M. Bergson's book. But there are some great difficulties left unresolved. (1) Perception which is said to select images may distort them—all the difficulties of the Kantian criticism are suggested thereby and they need notice. (2) The assumption of a peculiar memory which is aware of the past as such (with this may be compared Mr. L. T. Hobhouse's chapter on the subject) and which has no physiological substrate. The conception of the faculty itself offers difficulties enough, and the pathological evidence is surely quite insufficient. Even if there is no loss of images in psychic blindness (as the author contends) there may be loss of communication between image and perception. (3) Things are described as images; whose images are they? If only the observer's, why deny the sensorial character of the brain on the ground that the brain being itself an image cannot have images? Such an image might still have imagination. If things are images in the sense of psychic existences, the assumption is a very large one. Nor do we understand M. Bergson to say this; but the difficulty of the alternative remains.

S. ALEXANDER.

*La Logique de Hegel.* Par GEORGES NOËL. Professeur de Philosophie au Lycée Lakanal. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897. Pp. viii., 188.

Mr. Noël's book forms a most admirable introduction to the study of Hegel. He has grasped the great truth, which so many commentators ignore, that Hegel produced something which he asserted to be a demonstrated

and coherent system, and that the main point in any thorough criticism of his teaching must be to inquire, not whether it is genial, or suggestive, or inspiring, but whether it has been proved to be true. From this it follows that it is impossible to make any serious study of Hegel without mastering the *Logic*. The *Phenomenologie* is nothing but an introduction, the other works are only applications. On the validity of the *Logic* everything depends.

It is not, however, the beginner only who will find this book valuable. It would be impossible for any one, however well acquainted with Hegel's own works, to read it without gaining new light on the system as a whole, and, in a still greater degree, on the details of the *Logic*.

The first chapter is devoted to a general account of the dialectic method. Here Mr. Noël strikes, we think, the right note at the beginning by pointing out that the method is by no means so mysterious and unparalleled as has been asserted. "Le système de Hegel n'est que celui de Kant débarrassé de ses inconséquences" (p. 5). Nor does it reject the principle of contradiction. "Si en effet l'esprit ne répugnait à la contradiction, s'il pouvait y demeurer et s'y complaire, le procès dialectique s'arrêterait de lui-même ou pour mieux dire il ne saurait commencer. Est-il en effet autre chose que l'effort continu de l'esprit pour s'affranchir de la contradiction?" (p. 15).

The general view taken by Mr. Noël of the validity of the dialectic agrees with that taken by Mr. Bradley in his *Logic*—that the motive force of the process lies, not in the beginning, but in the synthesis which forms the end. Thus he says, "Loin de faire de l'abstrait le principe du concret, il s'attache obstinément à montrer que celui-là ne se comprend que par celui-ci" (p. 11). And again, "Si la contradiction nous y amène et nous la fait découvrir, ce n'est pas elle qui la produit. Elle préexistait en nous à l'aperception de la contradiction et c'est sa présence qui, quoique non remarquée, nous permis de poser la thèse et l'antithèse ainsi que leur rapport" (p. 16).

On these principles he finds no difficulty when, in chapter v. ("La Logique dans le Système"), he comes to deal with the transition from *Logic* to *Nature* which Prof. Seth finds so fallacious. "Prise dans son ensemble, la Logique soutient avec l'extra-logique un rapport analogue à celui qu'en son sein chaque catégorie soutient avec la suivante. Elle est un moment de l'Idée dont la Nature et l'Esprit sont les moments ultérieurs" (p. 117). This is followed by a careful discussion of the most perplexing feature in the transition—the emphasis which Hegel lays on the *freedom* of the passage to *Nature* (p. 124).

In chapters ii., iii. and iv., the three books of the *Logic* are discussed in detail. The Greater *Logic* is followed, where it differs from the *Logic* of the *Encyclopædia*. This course is obviously the most convenient for French students, since the Greater *Logic* has been translated into French, while the Smaller has not. And it must be admitted that the alterations which Hegel made in the argument when he composed the shorter version are scarcely improvements. On the other hand, the Smaller *Logic* presumably gives us Hegel's final view of the system.

These three chapters are in some respects the most valuable part of the book, but it is of course impossible to give any idea of their merits by extracts. A good example of Mr. Noël's clear and thoughtful exposition may be found in his treatment of the very difficult transition from *Werden* to *Dasein* (p. 25).

The seventh chapter is entitled "Le Dogmatisme de Hegel". The author has no difficulty in showing that Hegelianism bears no very close relation to Spinozism. He then goes on to suggest that, of all the

philosophers of the seventeenth century, Leibniz most closely resembles Hegel (p. 141). This is a significant and profound remark. It is to be regretted that it was not developed at greater length. It would involve the whole question of Hegel's treatment of the individual. We should perhaps have to distinguish between the recognition of the individual which Hegel ought to have yielded, on his own premises, and the disparagement of the individual which may not infrequently be found in his applications of his system.

The discussion of Hegel's pantheism which follows is perhaps scarcely exhaustive. No doubt Hegel's God is neither an unrealised ideal nor a blind necessity. But the further question still remains whether he is a society or a person. Both the Logic and the Philosophy of Religion give some grounds for supposing that he—or rather it—must be conceived as a society, and in that case Pantheist might perhaps be the least inappropriate label for Hegel's theological position.

The book closes with a discussion of the relation of Hegel to contemporary thought. It is devoted mainly to the consideration of objections raised by positivists and neo-criticists. It is natural that every writer should give most attention to the criticisms which come from his own country, but it would have been very interesting and useful if Mr. Noël had seen his way to include Lotze and Mr. Bradley among the philosophers he discusses. They both stand much nearer to Hegel than Comte or Mr. Renouvier, and, for that very reason, their differences from Hegel are more significant. They require careful and thorough treatment from a Hegelian standpoint, which no one would be better qualified to give than Mr. Noël, if he feels inclined to increase the debt which all students of Hegel already owe him for his brilliant and scholarly work.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

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- A. L. Ranney, *Eye-Strain in Health and Disease*, Philadelphia, New York and Chicago, The F. A. Davis Company, 1897, pp. viii., 321.
- K. S. Guthrie, *The Philosophy of Plotinos*, Philadelphia, Dunlop Printing Company, pp. 64.
- A. M. Bell, *The Science of Speech*, Washington, D.C., The Volta Bureau, 1897, pp. 56.
- T. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, London, Walter Scott, 1897, pp. xix., 455.
- E. Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, London, Walter Scott, 1897, pp. xiv., 390.
- W. Wundt, *Outlines of Psychology* (translated, with the co-operation of the author, by C. H. Judd), Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1897, London, Williams & Norgate, 1897, pp. xviii., 342.
- Dr. Christison, *Crime and Criminals*, Chicago, The W. T. Keener Company, 1897, pp. 117.
- F. H. Collins, *Epitome of Synthetic Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, with a preface by Herbert Spencer, fourth edition, London, Williams & Norgate, 1897, pp. xi., 680.
- J. H. Bridges (edited by), *The 'Opus Majus' of Roger Bacon*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1897, two vols., pp. clxxxvii., 404; 568.
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